Chapter 10: Torts by Donovan, Peter A.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1983 Article 13
1-1-1983
Chapter 10: Torts
Peter A. Donovan
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Civil Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Donovan, Peter A. (1983) "Chapter 10: Torts," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1983, Article 13.
CHAPTER 10 
Torts 
PETER A. DO NOV AN* 
§ 10.1. Sale of Alcoholic Beverages- Minors. During the Survey year, in 
Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc .1 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court extended tort liability to retail sellers of alcoholic bever-
ages for injuries arising from the sale of alcohol to minors.2 In reaching 
this holding, the Court concluded that injury inflicted by a minor while 
driving an automobile was a foreseeable consequence of the sale of 
alcohol to the minor.3 The decision follows the recent legislative and case 
law trend holding that the sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor may 
render the merchant liable to third persons involved in an automobile 
collision with the minor. 4 
Vendors in Massachusetts have a duty to refrain from selling alcohol to 
persons whom they know or should know are minors. In chapter 138, 
section 34B, the Legislature approved two cards, a liquor identification 
card and a driver's license, on which retailers of alcoholic beverages may 
reasonably rely to ascertain the age of youthful customers.5 A vendor may 
protect himself from tort liability by maintaining a record of the identifica-
tion cards of any person with a youthful appearance to whom it sells 
liquor.6 Moreover, if a vendor makes a mistake of fact in reasonably 
relying on the driver's license or liquor identification card of a minor to 
whom it sells alcohol, the vendor may use that mistake in defending itself 
against future negligence claims.7 Failure to request the identification 
approved by the Legislature, however, is probative on the issue of 
whether a vendor should have known a person was a minor whenever the 
individuallllis a youthful appearance.8 
· * PETER A. DO NOV AN is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. The 
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Michael Fatale in preparation of this 
chapter. 
§ 10.1. 1 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983). 
2 /d. at 7, 453 N.E.2d at 431. 
3 /d. at 12, 453 N.E.2d. at 434. 
4 See Donovan, Torts, 1982 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 11.1, at 1. 
5 390 Mass. at 11, 453 N.E.2d at 434. 
6 /d. 
7 /d. at 11 n.5, 453 N .E.2d at 434 n.5. 
8 /d. at 13, 453 N.E.2d at 435. 
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In Michnik-Zilberman, the retailer argued that tort liability should exist 
only when a sale of alcohol is made to an intoxicated customer. 9 Alterna-
tively, the retailer contended that it would be an unprecedented step for 
the Court to extend liability to package stores for injuries arising from 
sales to minors.10 Rejecting these arguments, the Court concluded that a 
sale of alcohol to a minor is evidence of negligence on the retailer's part 
even if the minor is not intoxicated at the time of the sale. 11 The Court 
further concluded that it is the sale or furnishing of alcohol which is 
critical to finding a retailer liable in tort. 12 In reaching this conclusion the 
Court analogized to the general rule that a person may be found negligent 
for furnishing a dangerous instrumentality to a child who uses it to cause 
harm because of the grave consequences which may foreseeably follow .13 
Addressing the issue of proximate cause, the Court stated that a ven-
dor's negligent sale of alcohol to a minor could lead to tort liability if the 
minor's actions while under the influence of alcohol and the harm caused 
as a result, were reasonably foreseeable. 14 Although there was evidence in 
Michnik-Zilberman that the vendor did not know that the minor would 
drive while intoxicated, the Court nevertheless concluded that the acci-
dent which occurred fell within the scope of the risk created. 15 Conse-
quently, according to the Court, it was not necessary that the plaintiff 
prove the store's ability to foresee the actual manner in which harm might 
occur. 16 
Michnik-Zilberman suggests that a retailer of alcoholic beverages who 
sells to a sober person who it knows or should know is a minor becomes 
an insurer covering harm subsequently caused by that minor. In Carey v. 
New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 17 a case involving the negligence of a 
tavern owner in supplying an intoxicated person with alcoholic beverages, 
the Supreme Judicial Court stated that serving hard liquor has a conse-
quence which is not successfully open to dispute. Such action, the Carey 
Court continued, may make the intoxicated individual unreasonably ag-
gressive and enhance a condition in which almost any irrational act is 
foreseeable. 18 In light of the Michnik-Zilberman Court's analogy of the 
retail seller of alcoholic beverages to a tavern owner, the Carey reasoning 
should apply equally to retail sellers of alcohol. Moreover, the Court in 
9 Id. at 10, 453 N.E.2d at 433. 
10 ld. 
II fd. 
12 ld. 
13 Id. at 10 n.4, 453 N.E.2d at 433 n.4. 
14 Id. at 13, 453 N.E.2d at 434. 
15 Id. at 13, 453 N.E.2d at 435. 
16 Id. at 13-14, 453 N.E.2d at 435. 
17 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420 (1969). 
18 Id. at 453, 243 N.E.2d at 422. 
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Michnik-Zilberman noted that the statutory prohibition of sales of alco-
holic beverages to minors as a class was enacted because the Legislature 
recognized their susceptibilities and the intensification of the otherwise 
latent dangers when those who lack maturity and responsibility drink.19 
Although the Michnik-Zilberman Court did not specifically address the 
possible consequences of its holding that a retail seller who negligently 
sells alcoholic beverages to a minor might thereby b~come an insurer 
covering harm subsequently caused by that minor, the Court observed 
that one readily foreseeable risk created by such retailer negligence is that 
the minor may drive and cause harm to others while intoxicated.20 As a 
result of this decision, retail sellers of alcohol should be advised to 
carefully check an4,_,keep a record of the identification cards of purchasers 
who have a youthful appearance. 
§ 10.2. Medical Malpractice - Duty to Inform - Mental Distress. In 
DiGiovanni v. Latimer1 the plaintiff brought suit for injuries allegedly 
sustained as a result of her doctor's failure to inform her that he had 
excised a portion of one of her fallopian tubes during surgery to remove an 
ovarian cyst.2 On appeal from the findings of a medical malpractice 
tribunal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the tribun-
al's conclusions, ruling that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that her 
physician's alleged negligence caused her injuries which were legally 
compensable.3 
In DiGiovanni the plaintiff claimed that her physician's failure to inform 
her that he had removed one fallopian tube during surgery caused her both 
emotional and physical harm.4 To support this claim, the plaintiff offered 
expert testimony that the removal of one fallopian tube inevitably makes 
conception more difficult.5 The plaintiff asserted that she suffered two 
distinct types of harm during the thirteen years she was unaware that her 
physician had removed one fallopian tube.6 First, the plaintiff argued that, 
because she was not aware that she had only one fallopian tube, she did 
19 390 Mass. at 11, 453 N.E.2d at 433. 
20 Id. at 12, 453 N.E.2d at 434. 
§ 10.2. 1 390 Mass. 265, 454 N.E.2d 483 (1983). 
2 I d. at 266, 454 N .E.2d at 484. A medical malpractice tribunal had earlier entered a report 
which concluded that evidence presented in this case was insufficient under G.L. c. 231, § 
261 to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry. I d. at 266, 454 
N .E.2d at 484. 
3 ld. at 269, 454 N.E.2d at 485-86. In so ruling, however, the Court did not address the 
question, presented for the first time, whether the failure to inform a patient of something 
that happened during an operation or other medical procedure breaches a physician's legal 
duty.Id. 
4 Id. at 269, 454 N.E.2d at 486. 
5 ld. 
6 Id. at 269-70, 454 N.E.2d at 486. 
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not pursue additional steps to help her conceive.7 In addition, the plaintiff 
argued that she suffered severe emotional distress because she could not 
become pregnant, although she had been told that there was no physical 
reason why she could not conceive.8 Second, the plaintiff also alleged that 
after she was informed in 1978 that one fallopian .tube had been removed 
during the earlier surgery, her emotional distress aggravated a previously 
controlled epileptic condition.9 
Addressing the first argument, the DiGiovanni Court found that the 
plaintiff had not adequately demonstrated that other steps were available 
to increase the likelihood of conception.10 According to the Court, the 
plaintiff, before a medical tribunal, must present not mere allegations or 
an oral offer of proof by counsel, but rather evidence which can be 
properly substantiated at trial. 11 In DiGiovanni the Court determined that 
the plaintiff's bare statement in her affidavit that she did not take other 
steps to become pregnant was insufficient to warrant finding that the 
defendant negligently inflicted emotional distress. 12 The Court found this 
conclusion especially compelling in light of its conclusion that the avail-
ability of pregnancy enhancing procedures was not a matter of common 
knowledge. 13 
The Court next addressed the plaintiff's claim concerning her epileptic 
condition. 14 Again, the Court concluded that a bare affidavit statement 
that there existed a causal relationship between the plaintiff's emotional 
distress and her aggravated epileptic condition was insufficient. 15 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that determining whether emo-
tional distress has resulted in a physical injury presents a difficult medical 
question .16 In the absence of proffered medical testimony connecting the 
seizures to the mental distress, the Court elected to follow Payton v. 
Abbott Labs17 and held that the plaintiff's claim in DiGiovanni for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress did not present a legitimate question 
of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry .18 Under Payton, a plaintiff 
suing to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress must allege 
and prove that she has sustained physical harm as a result of the conduct 
7 Id. 
8 ld. at 270, 454 N.E.2d at 486. 
9 Id. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. at 269, 454 N.E.2d at 485. 
12 Id. at 270, 454 N.E.2d at 486. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 ld. 
17 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). 
18 390 Mass. at 271, 434 N.E.2d at 486. 
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which caused the emotional distress. 19 A plaintiff's physical harm must 
therefore either cause or be caused by the emotional distress alleged, and 
the physical harm must be manifested by objective symptomatology and 
substantiated by expert medical testimony. 20 In DiGiovanni the plaintiff's 
claims failed because she did not demonstrate either that her physician's 
failure to inform resulted directly in physical harm which in turn caused 
her emotional distress, or, conversely, that his failure to inform caused 
her emotional distress which in turn caused a physical harm.21 
The three policy reasons articulated in Payton for denying recovery for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress in the absence of physical harm 
precluded the imposition of liability in DiGiovanni for emotional dis-
tress.22 These policy reasons are (1) that emotional distress which is not so 
serious as to have physical consequences is likely to be "so temporary, so 
evanescent and so relatively harmless" that the task of compensating for 
it would unduly burden defendants and the court; (2) that in the absence of 
the guarantees of genuineness provided by resulting physical harm, such 
emotional distress too easily can be feigned or imagined; and, (3) that 
where the defendant's conduct has been merely negligent, without intent 
to harm, his fault is not so great that he should be required to compensate 
the plaintiff for mental disturbance.23 These reasons were essentially 
unaffected by the possible arguments in DiGiovanni, acknowledged by 
the Court, that the relationship between a physician and a patient is 
fiduciary in nature, that a plaintiff has a right to determine what snail be 
done or not done with his or her body, and that a patient has an obvious 
interest in being informed of what a physician has done in the course of 
treatment. 24 
The DiGiovanni Court also apparently read Payton as a limitation upon 
the test articulated in Agis v. Howard Johnson, Co. ,25 for determining 
when a plaintiff can recover for intentionally inflicted emotional harm. 26 
Because the plaintiff in DiGiovanni alleged that the defendant intention-
ally withheld from her information about the removal of one fallopian 
19 386 Mass. at 544, 437 N.E.2d at 174. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 See id. at 272, 454 N.E.2d at 487. 
23 386 Mass. at 553, 437 N.E.2d at 180. 
24 390 Mass. at 272, 454 N.E.2d at 487. 
25 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). 
26 "It must be shown (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he 
knew or should have known that the emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; 
(2) that the conduct was 'extreme and outrageous,' was 'beyond all bounds of decency' and 
was 'utterly intolerable in a civilized community'; (3) that the actions of the defendant were 
the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and, (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the 
plaintiff was 'severe' and of a nature 'that no reasonable man could be expected to endure 
it."' /d. at 144-45, 355 N.E.2d at 318-319. 
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tube,27 she satisfied each of the Agis requirements, with the possible 
exception of extreme and outrageous conduct. In Agis a manager of a 
restaurant informed the restaurant's waitresses that someone was stealing 
from the restaurant and that, until the identity of the thief could be 
established, the manager would begin firing the waitresses in alphabetical 
order- whereupon he fired the plaintiff, whose name began with "A. " 28 
The Agis Court read the plaintiff's complaint to allege facts and circum-
stances which reasonably could lead the trier of fact to conclude that the 
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous. 29 In DiGiovanni, the 
Court was unwilling to determine that the evidence presented by the 
plaintiff raised a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial 
inquiry, despite the fact that the evidence suggested concealment by the 
defendants which may have been fraudulent. Instead, the Court focused 
on the plaintiff's complaint and stated that there was no allegation, 
argument, or suggestion that the defendant's conduct was of the extreme 
and outrageous nature required under Agis for recovery for intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress. 30 
The Court's reasoning in DiGiovanni seems inconsistent with Agis, 
since the defendant's concealment in DiGiovanni effectively prevented 
the plaintiff from obtaining information at the time of her surgery about 
whether her doctor's actions were tortious. If the plaintiff had been 
notified of the defendant's actions at the time of surgery, she might have 
been able to establish either negligent or intentional malpractice and thus 
have been able to recover for her diminished capacity to conceive.31 
DiGiovanni enables a doctor who obtains broad consent from his patient 
with respect to a particular operation to then fraudulently conceal possi-
bly tortious action taken in the course of the authorized procedure. The 
holding thus effectively licenses the intentional infliction by doctors of 
emotional distress upon patients in instances where the intentional inflic-
tion results in no physical harm, and where the accompanying negligence 
or intentional malpractice later proves impossible to establish. This cer-
tainly seems to license a caliber of behavior which is far more outrageous 
than that condemned in Agis. 
§ 10.3. Medical Malpractice- Causation- Apportionment of Damages. 
In Glicklich v. Spievack 1 the plaintiff brought a malpractice action on 
27 390 Mass. at 273, 434 N.E.2d at 487. 
28 371 Mass. at 141, 355 N.E.2d at 317. 
29 Id. at 143, 355 N.E.2d at 319. 
30 390 Mass. at 273, 454 N.E.2d at 487-88. 
31 The Court emphasized that the plaintiff's complaint raised only the defendant's failure 
to inform after the surgery, and that there were no allegations concerning negligent perfor-
mance, informed consent, or nonconsensual treatment. 390 Mass. at 266 n.1, 434 N.E.2d at 
484 n.l 
§ 10.3. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 488, 452 N.E.2d 287 (1983). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1983 [1983], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1983/iss1/13
§ 10.3 TORTS 311 
behalf of herself and her nine year old son to recover for damages 
sustained as a result of the alleged negligence of several physicians in the 
diagnosis and treatment of her breast cancer. 2 As a result of delay in 
treatment resulting from the incorrect diagnosis, the plaintiff's cancer 
metastasized and her life expectancy decreased from a fifty percent 
chance of a ten year survival to a possible lifespan of one or two years.3 
The jury returned separate verdicts against two of the defendant doctors, 
finding one responsible for $59,996 and the other responsible for 
$339,979.4 The verdicts also divided the recovery, granting separate dam-
ages to the plaintiff mother'and her son.5 Judgments notwithstanding the 
verdicts were granted in favor of both doctors on the trialjudge's finding 
of insufficient evidence upon which a jury could conclude that any mal-
practice on the part of the doctors was causally related to the injury 
sustained by the plaintiffs.6 The trial judge further held, however, that, if 
the defendants were liable, the jury was warranted in finding (1) that the 
plaintiff-son was economically dependent on his mother and therefore 
was entitled to recover damages, and (2) that the two doctors were not 
joint tort-feasors and that the negligence of the doctor principally at fault 
was not foreseeable by the doctor who referred the patient to him. 7 The 
judge then reported his rulings to the Appeals Court.8 
The Appeals Court reversed, concluding that there was sufficient evi-
dence upon which a jury could conclude that there was malpractice which 
was causally related to the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs.9 Spec-
ifically, the court held that the plaintiffs could recover upon proof by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence that the mother most probably would not 
have been injured to the same extent had proper treatment been adminis-
tered.10 At trial, the primary medical expert on causation had stated that 
he was unable to assert precisely at what time the mother's cancer 
metastasized or became inoperable, because the rate at which cancer 
spreads cannot be exactly determined. 11 The court noted that the tri!l-1 
judge, relying upon this statement in ruling for the defendants, had stated 
that the jury could not have rationally determined what damage was 
caused by the inevitable course of the plaintiff's cancer, and thus could 
not have rationally assessed damages.12 
2 Jd. at 489, 452 N.E.2d at 288. 
3 Id. at 495, 452 N.E.2d at 292. 
4 Id. at 489, 452 N.E.2d at 288. 
5 Id. at 489, 452 N.E.2d at 287. 
6 ld. 
7 Id. at 489, 452 N.E.2d at 288-89. 
8 Id. at 489, 452 N.E.2d at 289. 
9 Jd. at 493, 452 N.E.2d at 291. 
10 Jd. at 493, 452 N.E.2d at 290. 
11 Jd. at 493, 452 N.E.2d at 291-92. 
12 Jd. at 493, 452 N.E.2d at 291. 
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In reversing the trial court's decision, the Appeals Court focused on the 
medical expert's assertion that he could predict with reasonable certainty 
what would have happened to the plaintiff had she received treatment 
which met accepted standards of medical care .13 The expert testified that 
the plaintiff would have had an increased lifetime expectancy over a ten 
and fifteen year follow-up period had she received proper care. 14 Noting 
that the plaintiff was not required to show the exact cause of her injuries 
or to exclude all possibility that they resulted without fault on the part of 
the defendants, 15 the court ruled that the expert testimony presented at 
trial was sufficient to meet the plaintiff's legal burden with regard to 
proximate cause .16 
The court next considered the trial judge's holding that, if the defen-
dants were liable, the jury was warranted in awarding damages to the 
plaintiff-son on the theory that he was economically dependent upon his 
mother. 17 The defense had complained that no evidence was introduced 
showing that the son was in fact economically dependent on his mother. 18 
Previously, in Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 19 the Supreme Judicial 
Court had indicated that before a child can recover for loss of parental 
society the child must prove both economic and "filial-need" depen-
dence.20 The Glicklich court rejected the argument that both these aspects 
of dependence were necessary, and concluded that it was clear from 
Ferriter that the injured parent need not be the principal wage earner for 
her child to recover for loss of parental society. 21 The court determined 
that recovery would be allowed when the child was in the injured parent's 
household and was dependent on the parent for management of his physi-
cal needs, for emotional guidance and f(.Jf support.22 Therefore, the 
Glicklich Court found the evidence that the plaintiff prepared her son's 
meals, discussed his day with him, read him stories and generally took an 
13 ld. at 493, 452 N.E.2d at 292. 
14 /d. at 493-95, 452 N.E.2d at 291-92. The trial judge had concluded that the plaintiff 
failed to meet the burden of proving proximate cause in part because she had failed to 
demonstrate that she would have had a biopsy performed had Drs. Golub or Spievack so 
advised her. The Appeals Court disagreed, observing that the law presumes that a warning, 
if given, will be heeded. ld. at 493, N.E.2d at 290-91. 
15 Id. at 495, 452 N.E.2d at 292. 
1« Id. at 493-95, 452 N.E.2d at 291-92. 
17 Id. at 496, 452 N.E.2d at 292. 
18 ld. 
19 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1983). 
20 ld. at 516, 413 N.E.2d at 696. The Ferriter Court held that children have a viable claim 
for loss of parental society if they can show that they are minors dependent on the plaintiff 
parent. I d. This dependence must be rooted not only in economic requirements, but also in 
filial needs for closeness, guidance and support. Id. 
21 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 4%, 452 N.E.2d at 292. 
22 Id. at 496, 452 N.E.2d at 292. 
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interest in his play, school and friends was sufficient evidence upon which 
the jury could award the son damages for loss of parental society and 
guidance caused by medical negligence.23 
The Appeals Court in Glicklich also rejected the contention of the 
doctor who was found principally at fault that the plaintiff suffered a 
single indivisible injury which required an award of damages in a single 
amount against both defendants.24 The court applied the principle of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts that "[d]amages may be apportioned 
among two or more causes if there is a reasonable basis for doing so. " 25 
Because the court accepted the evidence of causation introduced by a 
medical expert as legally sufficient, it concluded that the further decrease 
in the plaintiff's lifetime expectancy resulting from the second doctor's 
later failure to inform the plaintiff to have a biopsy could reasonably have 
been found to constitute an independent event not foreseeable by the 
referring doctor who first failed to advise the mother to have a biopsy. 26 
Under Glicklich, a medical malpractice action will lie when it is more 
probable than not that the defendant physician's conduct, while not 
hastening death, reduced the patient's chance of survival. In addition, 
Glicklich extended a physician's liability to a plaintiff's children in a 
medical malpractice action in those circumstances where the plaintiff is 
not the household's principal wage earner, but provides for the children's 
physical, emotional and mental needs. 
§ 10.4. Colleges- Duty of Care- Campus Security. During the Survey 
year, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the issue of a college's duty to 
provide reasonable security on campus to protect students from rape. In 
Mullins v. Pine Manor College 1 a civil suit was brought against a college 
and its vice-president for operations by one of the college's students, 
alleging that negligent deficiencies in the college's security system were 
the proximate cause of her rape.2 The jury returned verdicts against the 
college and its vice-president in the amount of $175,000, which was 
reduced by the trial judge to $20,000 pursuant to Massachusetts' charita-
ble immunity statute.3 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the 
lower court's judgment. 
The Court initially noted that the general rule that there is no duty to 
protect others from the criminal or wrongful acts of third persons was not 
23 ld. 
24 Jd. at 496-97, 452 N.E.2d at 292. 
25 Jd. at 497,452 N.E.2d at 293 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §433A (1965)). 
26 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 497-98, 452 N.E.2d at 293. 
§ 10.4. 1 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983). 
2 Jd. at 47-48, 449 N.E.2d at 333. 
3 See G.L. c. 231, § 85(k), 389 Mass. at 48, 449 N.E.2d at 333. 
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applicable to the facts before it.4 The Court stated that the duty of due 
care owed by colleges and their administrators to their resident students 
could be partly based on societal values and customs.5 Under this basis 
for liability, the Court found the duty of care.firmly embedded in commu-
nity consensus and supported by the fact that colleges of ordinary pru-
dence usually exercise care to protect the well-being of their resident 
students, including seeking to protect them against criminal acts.6 This 
protection was necessary, the Court reasoned, because of the transitory 
nature of students' scholastic residence and their inability, due to the 
brevity of their residence, to design and implement a security system on 
their own initiative.7 The Court concluded that colleges must take respon-
sibility for implementing and maintaining security systems if anything is to 
be done at all.8 
In addition to the duty required by custom and community values, the 
Court also concluded that the duty of due care in Mullins was grounded in 
the principle that "a duty voluntarily assumed must be performed with 
due care."9 Consistent with this formulation, the Court recognized that 
the mere fact that a service has been voluntarily rendered is not by itself 
sufficient to impose a duty of due care.10 The Court further observed that 
it must also be shown either that the school's failure to exercise due care 
increased the risk of harm, or that the harm was suffered because of the 
student's reliance on the school's undertaking.U Although the Court did 
not determine whether the plaintiff or her family in fact relied on Pine 
Manor's representations or actions, it concluded that students and their 
parents rely on colleges to safeguard the students' well-being, and that 
prospective students and parents are certain to note the presence or 
absence of security measures and may choose to register elsewhere if a 
particular college's precautions are unsatisfactory .12 Moreover, the Court 
found that, implicit in Pine Manor's requirement that freshmen, such as 
the plaintiff, live in dormitories was the representation that the college 
believed it could provide adequately for the dormitory residents' safety 
and well-being.13 Finally, the Court noted that a duty of care arising out of 
4 !d. 
5 !d. at 51-52, 449 N.E.2d at 335. 
6 See id. at 51, 449 N.E.2d at 335. 
7 !d. at 50-52, 449 N.E.2d at 335. 
8 !d. at 52, 449 N.E.2d at 335. The Court stated: "The fact that a college need not police 
the morals of its resident students ... does not entitle it to abandon any effort to ensure their 
physical safety." !d. 
9 !d. at 52-53, 449 N.E.2d at 336. See Black v. New York, N.H., & H.R.R., 193 Mass. 
448, 79 N.E.2d 797 (1907); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 323 (1%5). 
10 389 Mass at 54-55, 449 N.E.2d at 336. 
11 !d. at 54, 449 N.E.2d at 336. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. at 54 n.ll, 449 N.E.2d at 337 n.11. 
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a particular relationship between the parties is embedded in Massachu-
setts case law ,14 
Turning to Pine Manor's argument that the criminal attack on the 
student was not foreseeable, the Mullins Court refused to apply the 
principle that ''an owner or occupier of land is under no duty to protect 
persons lawfully on the premises against the criminal acts of third persons 
unless prior criminal acts occurred on the premises." 15 This general 
doctrine, the Court reasoned, implicates a wide range of interests not 
present in the distinctive relationship between colleges and their stu-
dents.16 The queJtion whether an event is foreseeable, the Court stated, 
turns on an examination of all the circumstances, with prior criminal acts 
only one factor among many which serve to establish the foreseeability of 
a third party's criminal actY Reviewing the facts in Mullins, the Court 
concluded that the risk of criminal acts such as rape being committed on 
campus was not only foreseeable but had actually been foreseen, as 
evidenced by the warnings given to the students during freshman orienta-
tion.18 
The Court's decision in Mullins v. Pine Manor College is an important 
addition to Massachusetts tort law. The Mullins Court broke new ground 
in extending tort liability to colleges which fail to take adequate steps to 
ensure that campus security adequately protects its resident students. 
Following this decision, Massachusetts colleges and universities would do 
well to carefully review the adequacy of their current campus security 
measures, because Mullins has set forth a fairly rigorous standard of due 
care for campus security departments to meet. 
14 389 Mass. at 53 n.9, 449 N.E.2d at 336 n.9. 
15 /d. at 55, 449 N.E.2d at 337. 
16 /d. at 56, 449 N.E.2d at 337. 
17 /d. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 708-09, 297 N.E.2d 43, 53 (1973). The 
Mounsey Court stated that the " 'reasonable care in all the circumstances' standard will 
allow the jury to determine what burdens of care are unreasonable in light of the relative 
expense and difficulty they impose on the owner or occupier as weight against the probabil-
ity and seriousness of the foreseeable harm to others." /d. Because in Mounsey the 
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was that of a mere owner or occupier of land 
and a person lawfully upon the premises, it is likely that the principle which precludes 
liability for criminal acts of third persons unless prior criminal acts have already occurred on 
the premises, is of limited application in Massachusetts even outside "the distinctive 
relationship" in Mullins of college and student. 
18 389 Mass. at 54-55, 449 N.E.2d at 337. The Court also reviewed the sufficiency of the 
evidence before it in evaluating the plaintiffs negligence claim, and held that a jury could 
reasonably have found that the evidence supported the conclusions (I) that the school was 
negligent; and (2) that the school's negligence caused the plaintiff's injury./d. at 56-63, 449 
N .E.2d at 338-41. In addition, the Court refused to apply the charitable immunity doctrine in 
this case to shield the college's vice-president from liability, and rejected the vice-
president's contention that officers of charitable institutions should not be held liable for the 
negligent performance of discretionary functions without a showing of bad faith. I d. at 63-64, 
449 N.E.2d at 341-42. 
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§ 10.5. Mental Distress - Good Samaritan Doctrine. In Barnes v. 
Geiger, the complaint alleged that a mother had witnessed an accident in 
which she mistakenly believed her son was injured and accordingly 
rushed to the scene to aid the victim.' It was further alleged that although 
the victim was not her son, the mother nevertheless suffered severe 
emotional distress as a result of viewing the victim and died the following 
day.2 Her husband brought suit both in his own right and as administrator 
of his deceased wife's estate, seeking damages for her death and con-
scious suffering, for loss of consortium and for consequential damages.3 
The trial court dismissed the complaint as failing to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.4 
In affirming, the Appeals Court found the complaint deficient on both of 
the grounds upon which it could possibly be based.5 First, according to 
the court, the plaintiff failed to state a valid claim for physical injury based 
upon mental distress6 under Dziokonski v. Babineau. 7 In Dziokonski, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that a negligent action would lie against the 
driver of a car which struck a child upon allegations that the child's 
mother suffered emotional shock and consequent death when she went to 
the scene of an accident and saw her daughter lying injured on the 
ground.8 The Appeals Court in Barnes, was unwilling to extend 
Dziokonski by making tortfeasors liable to an unrelated person who mis-
takenly believes her child has been hurt.9 The requested extension, the 
court noted, would expand "unreasonably the class of persons to whom a 
tortfeasor may be liable." 10 Expressing the issue in terms of foreseeabil-
ity, the Barnes court stated that physical trauma and resulting physical 
injury to a person who mistakenly believes a close family member to be 
the victim of an observed accident is beyond that which is reasonably 
foreseeable." This conclusion, the court readily admitted, was a pragma-
§ 10.5. 1 15 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 446 N.E.2d 78 (1983). 
2 /d. at 365-66, 446 N.E.2d at 79. 
3 Id. at 365, 446 N.E.2d at 79. 
4 Id. at 366, 446 N.E.2d at 79. 
5 /d. at 366, 446 N .E.2d at 80. 
6 /d. at 366-69, 446 N.E.2d at 80-81. 
7 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). 
8 /d. at 557, 568, 380 N.E.2d at 1296, 1302. 
9 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 367-68, 446 N.E.2d at 80-81. In dicta, the court analogized mistakes 
about the identity of the victim with all mistakes concerning the circumstances of the 
accident, including mistake as to the gravity of the injury. /d. at 368, 446 N.E.2d at 81. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. at 368-69, 446 N.E.2d at 81. Cf. Dziokonski, 375 Mass. at 567, 380 N.E.2d at 1302 
(reasonably foreseeable that, if one negligently operates a motor vehicle and injures another, 
at least one person will be sufficiently attached emotionally to the injured person that he will 
be affected). 
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tic judgment rather than the systematic application of a general princi-
ple.12 
The Barnes court also rejected the plaintiff's second theory which 
attempted to premise the liability of the defendant upon the rescue doc-
trine.13 Under this doctrine, the court observed, negligence which creates 
peril invites rescue and, should the rescuer be hurt in the process, the 
tortfeasor is liable to both the primary victim and the rescuer .14 According 
to the court, the rescue doctrine should not be extended to all onlookers 
and would be rescuers simply because danger invites rescue and accidents 
invite onlookers. 15 The court therefore concluded that to achieve the 
status of a rescuer, a claimant's purpose must be more than investigatory, 
and some specific, reasonable mission to assist the victim must be as-
serted.16 Finally, the court noted that Dziokonski established that a close 
familial relationship must exist to set in motion the psychic trauma-
physical damage sequence, and concluded that this limitation would be 
effectively negated if the court found allegations of an undefined intent to 
rescue actionableY 
§ 10.6. Economic Harm - Negligence - Public Nuisance. The tradi-
tional concern about recovery of economic harm was the focus of the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher. 1 In 
Fisher, the defendants' vessels, by negligently colliding with and obstruct-
ing a drawbridge, substantially impaired access to two retail stores, al-
legedly causing the plaintiff, Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. ("Stop & 
Shop"), to suffer economic harm from the loss of business revenues.2 
Stop & Shop brought suit based upon theories of negligence and public 
nuisance.3 The trial court dismissed both counts and granted summary 
judgment for the defendants. 4 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that the question 
whether to allow recovery for negligently caused economic harm is one of 
policy.5 The Court further stated that the focus of this policy-oriented 
question is on determining at what point the tortfeasor's liability should 
12 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 369, 446 N.E.2d at 81 (citing Payton v. Abbot Labs, 386 Mass. 
540, 555-56, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982) (no right of action for emotional distress caused by 
negligence in the absence of physical harm)). 
13 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 369-71, 446 N.E.2d at 81-82. 
14 Id. at 369, 446 N.E.2d at 81. 
15 /d. at 371, 446 N.E.2d at 82. 
16 ld. 
17 Id. 
§ 10.6. 1 387 Mass. 889, 444 N.E.2d 368 (1983). 
2 Id. at 889, 444 N.E.2d at 369. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 891, 444 N.E.2d at 370. 
5 Id. at 8%, 444 N.E.2d at 373. 
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stop.6 Massachusetts had previously allowed negligence claims for recov-
ery of economic loss only where the plaintiff alleged some accompanying 
physical harm - either personal injury or physical damage to the plain-
tiff's property. 7 In Newlin v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. ,8 
for example, the plaintiff sought to recover for economic loss caused by 
the defendant's negligent maintenance of a telephone pole which fell, 
disrupting electric power to a plant where plaintiff had stored its perisha-
ble mushroom crop.9 Recovery was allowed for the economic loss due to 
the destruction of the mushrooms.10 Noting that Stop & Shop alleged no 
such damage to property, the Supreme Judicial Court denied the negli-
gence claim. 11 In doing so, the Court relied upon section 766(C) Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. Section 766(C) denies recovery for pecuniary 
harm which does not stem from physical injury resulting from the defen-
dant's negligent interference with the plaintiff's efforts to acquire a con-
tractual relation with a third person.12 
Although the Court rejected the negligence claim, it accepted Stop & 
Shop's claim alleging economic harm suffered as a result of a negligently 
caused public nuisance. 13 The Court noted that only a limited number of 
negligent acts generally give rise to public nuisances, particularly to 
obstructions of public ways.14 Therefore, according to the Court, the 
reasons for denying recovery on a general negligence theory were inappli-
cable, especially in light of both the degree of harm required for such an 
obstruction to amount to a public nuisance, and the dependence of 
businesses and their customers on access to business establishments. 15 
Moreover, the Court observed that the initial question in a public 
nuisance damage suit is whether the plaintiff has sustained some special 
and unique damage, different in kind and not merely in degree, from that 
experienced by others due to the alleged nuisance. 16 In the absence of 
6 Id. at 896-97, 444 N.E.2d at 373. 
7 See, e.g., Kilduff v. Plymouth County Elec., Co., 348 Mass. 328, 330-31, 203 N.E.2d 
679, 680 (1965); Morani v. Agatha Fisheries, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 257,259-60 (D. Mass. 1963); 
Newlin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 316 Mass. 234, 235, 54 N.E. 929, 931 (1944). 
8 316 Mass. 234, 54 N.E. 929 (1944). 
9 Id. at 235, 54 N.E. at 930. 
10 Id. at 237-38, 54 N.E. at 931. 
11 387 Mass. at 894, 444 N.E.2d at 371. 
12 ld. at 893-94, 444 N.E.2d at 371. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 766(C) 
(1977). 
13 387 Mass. at 896, 444 N.E.2d at 374. 
14 Id. at 897, 444 N.E.2d at 373. 
15 I d. The Court noted that a majority of federal cases have resolved the issue differently, 
denying recovery for economic loss resulting from a public way obstruction on both negli-
gence and public nuisance theories. Id. at 8% & n.4, 444 N.E.2d at 372-73 & n.4. 
16 I d. at 894, 444 N.E.2d at 372 (quoting Willard v. Cambridge, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 574, 575 
(1862)). 
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physical harm to the plaintiff's property, the Court stated, obstruction of 
a public way resulted in actionable damage under the old Massachusetts 
rule only if the obstruction cut off immediate access to a public highway 
or river from the plaintiff's premises. 17 Noting that strict adherence to this 
rule could preclude recovery even when an established business is "vir-
tually destroyed," the Court held that an established business may "state 
a claim in nuisance for severe economic harm resulting ftom loss of access 
to its premises by its customers.'' 18 The Court then found that a cause of 
action existed in Fisher, stressing the unique impact which a public 
nuisance obstruction may have on a business. 19 Acknowledging that the 
old rule decreased the number of lawsuits by setting up a clear and 
restrictive line between special and general damages, the court neverthe-
less concluded that the rule's clarity did not compensate for its preclusion 
of all claims, even those where a viable business is virtually destroyed.20 
Limiting the reach of its decision, the Fisher Court stressed that liability 
for economic loss caused by negligent obstruction of a public way will 
exist only where the plaintiff has suffered both severe pecuniary loss and 
substantial impaipnent of access.21 The Court stressed that both of these 
issues are questions of degree. 22 The requirement that pecuniary loss be 
severe is a direct limitation on the number of potential plaintiffs who can 
bring suit for public nuisance damages. If so many businesses have 
suffered the same economic harm that the plaintiff's damages are no 
longer special, the Court concluded, no cause of action would exist 
because the harm would then be public rather than unique.23 According to 
the Court, the requirement that the impairment of access be severe also 
limits liability. In giving courts guidance for determining when an impair-
ment is "substantial," the Court referred to the reasoning in property-
taking cases. 24 The Fisher Court stated that courts should examine the 
existence, availability and feasibility of alternate routes onto the property 
in question, along with the purposes for which the property has been 
used, when determining whether the plaintiff, or customers who previ-
ously had a reasonable relation to a road system reaching the property, 
have been left without such access.25 
17 387 Mass. at 894-95, 444 N.E.2d at 372. 
18 ld. 
19 Id. at 897, 444 N.E.2d at 373. 
20 Id. at 895, 444 N.E.2d at 372. 
21 Id. at 899, 444 N.E.2d at 374. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 897, 444 N.E.2d at 373. 
24 Id. at 897-99,444 N.E.2d at 373. See, e.g., Malone v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 74, 
80, 389 N.E.2d 975, 979 (1979),; Stanwood v. Malden, 157 Mass. 17, 18 (1892). 
25 387 Mass. at 898,444 N.E.2d at 374 (quoting Malone v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 79, 
80, 389 N.E.2d 975, 979 (1979)). 
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The Fisher Court's finding of special damage is somewhat consistent 
with prior Massachusetts law because the "immediate access" require-
ment under the old rule would allow recovery for economic harm in the 
absence of direct property damage. The alleged impairment of access in 
Fisher, however, although substantial, was not direct, and hence failed 
under the old rule. The Court in Fisher thus extended liability in public 
nuisance cases to established businesses that suffer substantial curtail-
ment of access and severe pecuniary loss. 
The Fisher decision also suggests that in the future Massachusetts may 
further expand liability and follow Burgess v. M!V Tamano,26 a seminal 
case in this area. In Tamano, commercial fishermen were allowed to 
recover for loss of livelihood caused by the defendant's negligent spillage 
of oil in a river, although hotel owners and other businesses along the 
beach were denied recovery for their loss of tourist-customers.27 At first 
glance, the reasoning in Fisher would seem contrary to that in Tamano. 
For example, the Court's holding in Fisher applies only to public nui-
sances which have caused severe economic harm to established busines-
ses due to substantial impairment of access, and therefore neither class of 
plaintiffs in Tamano would have recovered under the reasoning in Fisher. 28 
In addition, both plaintiff classes in Tamano were large, implicating the 
Fisher Court's concern that liability for negligently caused economic loss 
be strictly limited. 29 Furthermore, the Fisher Court concluded that when an 
entire community economically suffers from a nuisance then the wrong 
becomes public and the plaintiffs cannot recover.30 Nevertheless, the 
fishermen's allegations in Tamano of interference with their direct exer-
cise of a public right, were deemed sufficiently different in kind from that 
suffered by the public generally so as to warrant a nuisance claim for 
recovery. 31 The Fisher Court similarly emphasized the uniqueness of the 
economic harm suffered by the plaintiff-business. The decision in Fisher 
may signal a relaxation of hitherto rigidly applied liability rules which limit 
negligence in Massachusetts. If such is the case, the Supreme Judicial 
Court might follow the reasoning of the Tamano decision in future cases 
and allow recovery to a broader class of plaintiffs to whom negligent 
behavior has caused purely economic harm. 
§ 10.7. Vicarious Liability- Inherently Dangerous Activity- Employ-
ers of Independent Contractors. In Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 1 a case of 
26 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973). 
27 Id. at 250-51. 
28 387 Mass. at 899, 444 N.E.2d at 374. 
29 Id. at 896, 444 N.E.2d at 372. 
30 Id. at 897, 4M N.E.2d at 373. 
31 370 F. Supp. at 250. 
§ 10.7. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 463, 452 N.E.2d 271 (1983). 
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first impression in Massachusetts, the Appeals Court held that a general 
contractor, the employer of an independent contractor, was not liable for 
injuries to employees of the independent contractor caused by the negli-
gence of either that contractor or other independent contractors solely on 
the theory that the delegated work was inherently dangerous. 2 In this 
case, the plaintiff-employee sustained severe injuries when struck by a 
motor vehicle during the course of his employment as a construction 
worker on a highway rebuilding project.3 
In reaching its decision, the Vertentes court followed the general rule 
that employers of independent contractors are not liable for physical harm 
to others caused by the negligence of the contractor.4 The court distin-
guished cases involving injury to members of the general public by em-
ployers of independent contractors. Under this exception to the general 
rule, where the work to be performed is likely to cause physical harm to 
members of the general public absent adequate precautions, the employer 
of an independent contractor is answerable in tort for the contractor's 
failure to take such precautions. 5 The court observed that those who 
request the performance of work of such an intrinsically dangerous nature 
that members of the general public will likely be injured unless special 
precautions are taken should not be allowed to escape liability through the 
device of a contract with an independent contractor. 6 According to the 
court, employees do not stand in the same position as the general public, 
who may not be aware of the dangerous nature of the activity. 7 Imposing 
liability on a general contractor in this situation, the court concluded, 
would depart substantially from the grounds which underlie the doctrine 
of vicarious liability for inherently dangerous work.8 
The Vertentes court also relied on the availability of worker's compen-
sation for employees like the plaintiff who are injured while on the job.9 
Cautioning that courts should be hesitant to tinker with the legislatively 
enacted worker's compensation system, the court concluded that allow-
ing recovery by an injured subcontractor's employee against the general 
contractor would create an imbalance in the system's present allocation of 
risks. 10 Thus, the court observed that imposing liability against a general 
contractor who employs an independent contractor to perform inherently 
2 Id. at 468, 452 N.E.2d at 274. 
3 /d. at 463, 452 N.E.2d at 272. 
4 /d. at 466, 452 N .E.2d at 273. See a/so, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 409 (1966). 
Whalen v. Shivek, 362 Mass. 142, 150, 93 N.E.2d 393, 395-97 (1950). 
5 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 468, 452 N.E.2d at 274. 
6 !d. 
7 !d. at 468 n.7, 452 N.E.2d at 274 n.7. 
• !d. at 468-69, 452 N.E.2d at 274. 
9 !d. at 469, 452 N .E.2d at 274-75. 
10 !d. 
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dangerous work might cause general contractors to demand indemnity 
from its subcontractors to pay for the cost of possible employee tort 
recoveries.U Conversely, the court observed, without such a right to 
indemnity, a disproportionately large burden would fall on employers 
engaged in hazardous work who employ subcontractors to perform part or 
all of that work.12 
Finally, the Vertentes court concluded that the general contractor was 
not directly liable for its failure to discover the condition which resulted in 
the plaintiff's injury, despite the fact that it retained ultimate responsibil-
ity for correcting safety deficiencies, patrolling the entire construction 
zone and ascertaining that proper procedures had been followed. 13 Noting 
the lack of evidence that the defendant general contractor had been 
delinquent in its inspections of the work site on the day of the plaintiff's 
injury or that it had actual or constructive notice of any hazard, the court 
concluded that a finding of negligence would merely be based on surmise 
and not on any evidence before it.14 
In summary, the Appeals Court in Vertentes failed to adopt a rule which 
would permit injured employees of a subcontractor to successfully sue the 
general contractor on a vicarious liability theory. Instead, the Vertentes 
court decided that, in Massachusetts, general contractors are not liable in 
negligence to employees of subsidiary independent contractors solely on 
the ground that the delegated work was of an inherently dangerous na-
ture.15 
§ 10.8. Immunity- Governmental- Discretionary Function Exception. 
Cady v. Plymouth Carver Regional School District1 provided Massachu-
setts with its first opportunity to construe the "discretionary function" 
exception contained in Section 10(b) of the 1978 Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act.2 This provision provides that the Act shall not apply to "any 
claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform ·a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer 
or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or employment, 
whether or not the discretion involved is abused.' '3 Following an exten-
sive discussion of federal cases construing similar language in the Federal 
Tort Claims Act,4 the Cady court concluded that when a public employee 
11 /d. 
12 /d. 
13 ld. at 470-71, 452 N.E.2d at 275-76. 
14 /d. 
15 /d. at 468, 452 N.E.2d at 274. 
§ 10.8. 1 17 Mass. App. Ct. 211, 457 N.E.2d 294 (1983). 
2 /d. at 213, 457 N.E.2d at 296. See G.L. c. 258, § 15. 
3 G.L. c. 258, § 510(b). 
4 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). 
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is required to decide and act without fixed or readily ascertainable stan-
dards to fall back upon, that act is discretionary and therefore is entitled 
to tort immunity. 5 Conversely, the court concluded that, if a standard by 
which a governmental action may be measured is readily ascertainable, 
whether or not written or the product of experience, it does not fall within 
the discretionary function exception.6 Based upon its formulation of the 
appropriate standard by which to measure a challenged governmental 
action, the Cady court held that where the defendant school officials had 
allowed two students who had attacked the student plaintiff to return to 
school following temporary suspension without taking precautions to 
safeguard the plaintiff from further harm, the governmental acts fell 
within the discretionary function exception.7 
The Cady "fixed or readily ascertainable" standard differs from the 
formulation previously articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Whit-
ney v. Worcester ,8 an opinion which played an instrumental role in the 
Massachusetts Legislature's development and enactment of the Tort 
Claims Act. In Whitney, the Court stated that the dividing line between 
protected and unprotected activities fell between functions which rest on 
the use of judgment and discretion and represent planning and policymak-
ing, and those which involve implementing and executing such gov-
ernmental policy or planning.9 The court's decision in Cady, along with its 
formulation of the appropriate standard by which to differentiate between 
protected and unprotected governmental activities, is narrower in scope 
than was the Whitney Court's articulation of the appropriate standard. 
Under the Whitney formulation, those employees who implemented and 
executed governmental policies did not fall within the exception to the 
tort liability. Under Cady, however, those governmental employees who 
implement or execute policies are exempt if they act without fixed or 
readily ascertainable standards. Whether the Whitney or Cady approach 
is ultimately adopted by Massachusetts courts remains to be seen. 
§ 10.9. Immunity- Interspousal. During the Survey year another case 
was decided rejecting interspousal immunity as a barrier to an action in 
tort. In Nogueira v. Nogueira 1 the Supreme Judicial Court adhered to its 
earlier broad rejection of this immunity in Brown v. Brown.2 Although 
Nogueira contains unfortunate language which, if improperly read, sug-
5 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 215, 457 N.E.2d at 297. 
6 /d. 
7 /d. at 216, 457 N.E.2d at 297. 
8 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977). 
9 /d. at 217, 366 N.E.2d at 1216. 
§ 10.9. 1 388 Mass. 79, 444 N .E.2d 940 (1983). 
2 381 Mass. 231, 409 N.E.2d 717 (1980). 
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gests a limitation of Brown, the Nogueira language is a result only of the 
particular factual situation presented. 
In 1976, the Supreme Judicial Court in Lewis v. Lewis3 first held that the 
common law rule of interspousal immunity does not bar an action by a 
wife against her husband for injuries sustained by her in an automobile 
accident resulting from his negligence.4 Brown v. Brown extended this 
doctrine beyond automobile torts to all actions for personal injury. 5 The 
Court in Brown allowed a wife's claim that her husband was negligent in 
causing her injury by failing to take proper care of property jointly owned 
by the couple.6 The Brown Court recognized that the marital relationship 
might still serve as a bar to some actions, but noted that this denial of 
liability is not grounded on interspousal immunity. 7 Rather, according to 
the Court, it rests on the marital concessions implied in the relationship, 
specifically the "privileged or consensual aspects of married life. " 8 
In Nogueira, the Supreme Judicial Court relied on Brown in reversing 
the trial court's dismissal of a complaint based on interspousal immunity. 9 
The issue arose in the context of a suit brought by a husband against his 
wife for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon a 
letter she wrote four days after the entry of judgment nisi in their divorce 
suit.10 In reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment, the 
Nogueira Court observed that tortious behavior which occurs after the 
entry of a judgment nisi does not affect the privileged or consensual 
aspects of married life. 11 
To this point, Nogueira is clearly consistent with Brown. The Nogueira 
Court, however, further noted that, because of the initiation of divorce 
proceedings, nothing but a shell of the marital relationship remained at the 
time the torts were allegedly committed. 12 This unfortunate language, 
suggesting that the Court carefully considered the health of the 
Nogueiras' marriage at the time the torts in issue were committed, is not a 
part of the focus in Brown. It is best viewed as a response by theN ogueira 
Court to the plaintiff's contention that Lewis, and not Brown, should be 
the controlling precedentY The Nogueira Court noted that, as stated in 
Lewis, the chief policy reason why under appropriate circumstances, it 
3 370 Mass. 519, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976). 
4 !d. at 630, 351 N.E.2d at 532. 
5 381 Mass. at 233, 409 N.E.2d at 718-19. 
6 /d. at 231, 409 N.E.2d at 719. 
7 /d. 
8 /d. 
9 388 Mass. at 81, 444 N.E.2d at 941. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. at 80, 444 N.E.2d at 941. 
12 !d. at 82, 444 N.E.2d at 942. 
13 /d. at 80, 444 N.E.2d at 941. 
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will still consider the status of the marital relationship as a bar to certain 
tort actions is preservation of the peace and harmony of the marital 
home. 14 It concluded, however, that where marital harmony no longer 
exists, as in Nogueira, there can be no question of a bar to an action in 
tort. 15 
§ 10.10. Privilege - Resistance to Unlawful Arrest. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court in Commonwealth v. Moreira 1 reviewed the common law rule 
that a person has the right to use force to resist an unlawful arrest. 
Massachusetts had adopted this principle in Commonwealth v. Crotty in 
1865.2 The recent trend in the United States, however, has been away 
from this old rule and toward the resolution of disputes in court.3 The 
Moreira Court decided to follow this trend, concluding that the common 
law rule is no longer consistent with the needs of modern society and 
should no longer be followed. 4 
The Moreira Court based its decision principally on the number of legal 
remedies available to those unlawfully arrested. The Court concluded 
that, in view of constantly expanding legal protection of the accused's 
rights in criminal proceedings, arrestees reasonably may be required to 
submit to a possibly unlawful arrest and to take recourse in available legal 
processes to restore their liberty. 5 Included in these legal processes are 
liberal bail laws, appointed counsel, the right to remain silent, speedy 
arraignment and speedy trial.6 The Court further opined that arrestee 
"self-help" is anti-social in an urban society.7 Moreover, the Court ob-
served, the legality of an arrest may often be a close question about which 
lawyers and judges disagree.8 The Court concluded that such a close 
question is more properly decided by a detached magistrate rather than by 
the participants in what may well be a "highly volatile imbroglio. " 9 
In addition, the Court held that, absent excessive or unnecessary force 
by an arresting officer, individuals may not use force to resist an arrest by 
one whom they know or have good reason to believe is an authorized 
police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, regardless of 
14 Id. at 81-82, 444 N.E.2d at 942. 
15 Id. at 82, 444 N.E.2d at 942. 
§ 10.10. 1 388 Mass. 596, 447 N .E.2d 1224 (1983). 
2 10 Allen 403, 405 (1865). 
3 388 Mass. at 599, 447 N.E.2d at 1226. 
4 ld. 
5 Id. at 599-600, 447 N.E.2d at 1227. 
6 Id. at 600, 447 N.E.2d at 1227. 
7 Id. 
8 ld. 
9 Id. 
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whether the arrest was unlawful under the circumstances. 10 Where, how-
ever, the officer uses excessive or unnecessary force in his attempt to 
subdue the arrestee, regardless of whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful. 
The rules pertaining to self-defense apply. 11 The arrestee may then defend 
himself by employing such force as reasonably necessary to repel the 
excessive force being applied to him.12 The Court warned that once the 
arrestee knows or reasonably should know that if he desists from using 
force in self-defense, then the officer himselfwill cease using force, the 
arrestee must desist or he will forfeit the self-defense privilege.13 Accord-
ing to the Court, the questions whether the officer used excessive force 
and whether the arrestee used reasonable force to resist the excessive 
force are questions of fact to be resolved by the jury on proper instruction 
by the trial judge.14 
§ 10.11. Statute of Limitations - Discovery Rule. In Olsen v. Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, Inc./ the Supreme Judicial Court determined 
that the discovery rule, first articulated in Hendrickson v. Sears ,2 governs 
when a cause of action for negligence resulting in an insidious occupa-
tional disease accrues under chapter 260, section 2A. 3 In Olsen, suit was 
brought to recover for negligence in causing bronchial asthma through the 
plaintiff's exposure to a toxic substance in the course of his employment.4 
The Court ruled that a cause of action accrued for the purpose of chapter 
260, section 2A, on the date the plaintiff "discovered or should rea-
sonably have discovered'' that he had contracted asthma as a result of the 
defendants' conduct.5 In so ruling, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the cause of action for a claim for permanent injury accrues at 
the time at which "the permanency is, or should have been discovered." 6 
The argument that the extent of the injury, and not the knowledge of its 
existence, determines the accrual date was rightfully rejected by the 
Court in light of the purpose behind the discovery rule. As stated in 
Franklin v. Albert ,1 the discovery rule is designed to cure the manifest 
10 I d. at 601,447 N.E.2d at 1227. This rule is to apply to incidents occurring after the date 
of the decision. /d. Cases to the contrary in the Commonwealth are overruled to this degree. 
/d. 
11 Id. at 601, 447 N.E.2d at 1228. 
12 ld. 
13 Id. at 602, 447 N.E.2d at 1228. 
14 ld. 
§ 10.11. 1 388 Mass. 171, 445 N.E.2d 609 (1983). 
2 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974). 
3 388 Mass. at 175-76, 445 N.E.2d at 612. 
4 Id. at 172, 445 N.E.2d at 610. 
5 Id. at 175, 445 N.E.2d at 612. 
6 ld. 
7 381 Mass. 611, 411 N.E.2d 458 (1980). 
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injustice that would result from application of the traditional rule that a 
cause of action arises at the time of the commission of the tort.8 If strictly 
followed, the traditional rule would operate to punish blameless igno-
rance, as contrasted with negligent delay, by holding a cause of action 
time-barred before the plaintiff reasonably could know of the harm that he 
has suffered.9 To avoid such an unjust result, the discovery rule deviates 
from the policy of promoting societal repose embodied in statutes of 
limitation. 10 As the Olsen Court noted, acceptance of the plaintiff's argu-
ment would create an unacceptable imbalance between affording plaintiffs 
remedies and providing defendants with a finite period of potential liabil-
ity .11 
Not decided in Olsen was the question whether the statutory period 
commenced with the discovery of the harm itself or with the discovery 
that it was caused by conduct for which the defendant was responsible. 
Olsen provided the opportunity for resolution of this question because the 
plaintiff's disease became worse after discontinuance of his exposure to 
the toxic substance in question, a phenomenon suggesting that exposure 
was not the cause of his harm. The plaintiff, however, had been informed 
during an early diagnosis of his illness that the toxic substance in question 
had probably played a significant role in causing his symptoms.12 Conse-
quently, there was evidence from which the Court might have concluded 
that the plaintiff's knowledge, both of the harm and its cause, was con-
temporaneous. While the holding is ambiguous on this point, the Court 
did rely upon a case which indicated that the statute of limitations would 
not begin running until the plaintiff became aware of the causal connec-
tion to the defendant's conduct, even if this occurred subsequent to his 
knowledge of the existence of the harm itself.13 
Olsen also failed to answer the question, left unresolved in Hen-
drickson, 14 whether the plaintiff's cause of action would have "accrued 
on the discovery of inappreciable harm." 15 This issue was not clearly 
raised in Olsen because the facts established that the plaintiff knew from 
8 Jd. at 612, 411 N.E.2d at 459-60. 
9 Id. at 618, 411 N.E.2d at 463. 
10 Id. at 617-18, 411 N.E.2d at 462-63. 
11 388 Mass. at 173, 445 N.E.2d at 612. 
12 Id. at 173, 445 N.E.2d at 611. 
13 Id. at 176,445 N.E.2d at 612. See Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 323 F. Supp. 
671, 674 (D.D.C. 1931). ("Under the 'discovery rule' which has been applied in both cases of 
medical malpractice and latent occupational diseases, the statute of limitations begins to run 
when the plaintiff learned, or in exercise of reasonable diligence could have learned, that the 
injuries were caused by defendant's actions.") 
14 365 Mass. at 91, 310 N.E.2d at 136. "We do not consider the question whether a cause 
of action would accrue on discover in the absence of appreciable harm." I d. 
15 388 Mass. at 171, 445 N.E.2d at 612. 
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the beginning that he would experience a severe disability .16 Furthermore, 
Olsen is distinguishable from cases in which plaintiffs suffer successive 
but distinct injuries- for example, asbestosis followed by the unrelated 
disease of cancerY Because a plaintiff may reasonably be expected to 
find out about the seriousness of a disease at the time when it is diag-
nosed, the plaintiff is placed on notice of the severity of his disease as 
soon as he learns of its existence. By contrast, a plaintiff who discovers a 
second disease, wholly unrelated to the first, is in no way placed on notice 
as to the existence of his second disease by knowledge of the former. 
Consequently, the statute of limitations should begin anew for a plaintiff 
with a second distinct disease. 
16 /d. at 173, 445 N.E.2d at 611. 
17 /d. at 176, 445 N.E.2d at 612. 
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